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. tinct, and the one may exist without the other. . . . The
rights of an author of a drama in his composition are two- .
fold. He is entitled to the profit arising from its performance, and also from the sale of the manuscript, or the
printing and publishing it." That distinction is impliedly
recognized by the provisions of section 11 of the copyright
law. In the present case we may assume that the author
or his assignee still has the common law right of first publication,'redress for the infringement of which it is also assumed
may be sought in the state courts. To support the contention that Rosen still has the common law right of exclusive
performance, the respondent relies on certain language in the
case of Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 Fed. (2d) 80, 83, where it was said: "It certainly
would be a strangely perverse anomaly that turned the grant
of statutory copyright into a detriment to the' author'; yet
it would be hard to prove that the statutory remedies·· conferred made up for the limitation of the monopoly. ,; The
case did not present a question of the concurrent existence of
common law and statutory copyright.in the same subject
matter. The court was discussing the question of the survival of the common law right after pUblication and apart
from statute. Its remarks were intended as a refutatIon of
the contention that after passage of the copyright act, publication by the author without registering under the act did
not destroy the common law right. It pointed out that if
it did not constitute a complete exercise of the common law
right in every case, an author who copyrighted his work
would lose rather than gain from compliance with the statute,
inasmuch as without compliance his monopoly to multiply
copies would exist forever.
In Underhill v. Schenck, 193 N. Y. Supp. 745, 748, it was
stated that the right of exclusive dramatic representation
"asserted by plaintiff must not be confused with any. right
of literary property which he might claim as an author either
under the copyright statutes or at common law." The court
in that case denied relief for a violation of the copyright by
production of the play on the ground that relief must be
sought in the federal courts. The· ~ase of Berry v. Hoffman,
125 Pa. Super. 261 [189 Atl. 516], recognized that section 2
of the copyright law referred to those rights existing at
common law before publication, and upheld in the state forum
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a claim of copyright before publication apart from the statute .
The case did not involve any statutory copyright. The case
of Caruthers v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, 20 Fed. Supp. 906,
was commenced in the state court and was transferred to
the federal court because of diversity of citizenship. It involved only the common law right. It was not shown that
the work had either been published or copyrighted under the
statute.
[4] In the present case, as we have noted, the right
created under section 11 of the copyright law is not assumed
to have destroyed any common law right to the first publication of the dramatic composition. It did secure to the
holder of the copyright the exclusive right to reproduce the
play for profit for the term prescribed by the statute. The
right thus· secured was a substitute for the author's common
law right of performance, and the plaintiff in the pending
action is restricted to the remedies afforded by the statute
for any infringement of that right. The only court in which
he may seek such redress originally is the United States
District Court, as specified by section 34 of the copyright
statute.
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Curtis,J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., White, J.,
pro tem., and Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred.

[L. .A. No. 17553; In Bank.-Aug. 18, 1941.]

VIRGINI.A M. DILLON, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF
. PENSION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF LOS
ANGELES et a1., Respondents.
[1] Mandamus - Defenses - Statute of Limitations.- Code Civ.
Proc. §§ 312, 338, are applicable to actions in mandamus to enforce a statutory liability. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.)
[2] Pensions-Actions-Limitations._The right to receive periodic payments under a pension is a continuing one; and any

McK. Dig. References: 1. Mandamus, § 74; 2. Pensions, § 11;
3, 6, 7. Police, § 35; 4. Municipal Corporations, § 466; 5. Limitation
of Actions, § 109.
.
.
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time limitation upon the right to sue fo1' each instalment necessarily commences to run from the time when. that instalment
actually falls due.
[3a,3b] Police-Actions-Limitations-Pensions.-A cause of action to establish the right of a policeman's widow to a pension
accrues at the time of her husband's death. And a mandamus
proceeding to establish the right to such pension is barred by,
Code Civ. Proc., § 338, if commenced more than three years
after such death, exclusive of the period of the pension board's
deliberations on the claim. (Talbot v. Oity of Pasadena, 28
Cal. App. (2d) 271, 82 Pac. (2d) 483, overruled.)
[4] Municipal Oorporations-Actions-Limitations-Time of Deman d.-Where a charter provision requires an application to
a board before a court proceeding, a claimant cannot delay the
running of the statute of limitations by postponing the time
of demand upon the proper officials. The statute begins to
run at the time when he first had the power to make such
demand.
[5] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - Prevention
from Taking Action.-The running of the statute of limitations is suspended during any period in which the plaintiff is
legally prevented from taking action to protect his rights.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 356.)
[6] Police-Actions-Limitations - Pensions - Suspension ofPerio d.-The running of the statute of limitations against a
cause of action to establish the right to a pension is tolled
during the period of the deliberations of the pension board,
that is, from the time the claim is filed until the decision of
the board is rendered.
[7] Id.-Actions-Limitations-Pensions-Charter Provision Construed.-A charter provision forbidding suit on any claim
other than for damages unless presented· within six months
after the accrual of the last item of the account or claim, does
not affect the time limitation upon the right to bring an action
of mandamus to establish the right of a policeman's widow to
a pension, that limitation being governed by the. Code of Civil
Procedure. Under the charter provision,it is necessary to file
but one claim with the pension board.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed.
3. See 21 Cal. Jur. 415; gOal. Jur. Ten-year Supp., Pocket Part,
§ 27.
5. See 16 Cal. Jur. 562, 564.
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel city pension board to
issue an order for payment of a pension. Judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer to the first
amended petition, without leave to amend, affirmed.
Pollock & Pollock, Edward 1. Pollock, David Pollock, Theodore A. Horn and Louis Miller for Appellant.
Ray, L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader,
Assistant City Attorney, and Robert J. Stahl, Deputy City
Att()rney, for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff's husband, a police officer for the
city of Los Angeles, committed suicide in April, 1934. Within
six months, plaintiff made application to the Board of Pension
Commissioners . of the City of Los Angeles for a widow's pension under article 17, section 183 of the charter of the city of
Los Angeles. The board denied the application in February,
1935. In December, 1938, plaintiff filed the present proceeding in mandam'Lts to compel the board to issue an order for the
payment to her of a pension inclllding a cash sum equal to the
pension funds accrued in the three years preceding the date
o~ the filing of the petition plus the amount of pension that
will have accrued from that date to and including the date
of such order with interest. The petition alleged that plaintiff's husband, in the course of his duties as police officer,
suffered two accidents which caused severe injuries to his body
and nervous system, giving rise to a condition of mental unbalance during which he took his life. Defendants demurred
to the petition on the grounds that the petition did not state
suffici~mt facts regarding the nature and extent' of the deceased's injuries and his mental condition before death, and
that any cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend, holding that the cause was barred by the statute of
Umitations. Upon being refused leave to file a second amended
petition, plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal.
. [lJ Sections 338 and 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which are applicable to actions in mandamus (Code Civ.
Proc., sec. 1109), provide that an action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, must be
commenced within three years after the cause of action has
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accrued. Whether or not the plaintiff's action is barred by
this statute of limitations, therefore, turns upon when her
cause of action accrued. [2] The right to receive periodic
payments under a pension is a continuing one (see Dryden v.
Board of Pension Oommrs., 6 Cal. (2d) 575 [59 Pac. (2d)
104J ), and any time limitation upon the right to sue for each
instalment necessarily commences to run from the time when
that instalment actually falls due. Before plaintiff can claim
these periodic payments, however, she must establish her
right to a pension. If the Board of Pension Commissioners·
refuses to acknowledge this right upon application, she can
properly bring an action of mandamus in the superior court
to review the soundness of the board's decision, and to establish as a matter of law that she is entitled to the status of a
pensioner. (French v. Cook, 173 Cal. 126 [160 Pac. 411];
Sheehan v. Board of Police Commrs., 197 Cal. 70 [239 Pac.
844J.) An action to determine the existence of the right thus
necessarily precedes and is distinct from an action to recover
instalments which have fallen due after the pension has been
granted.
[3a] A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and the statute of limitations therefore begins
to run at that time. (Osborn v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501, 506
[117 Pac. 519, Ann. Oas. 1913A, 413].) The cause of action
to establish the right to a pension accrued to plaintiff at the
time of her husband's death. At any time following the
death she could demand a pension from the board and upon
refusal could maintain a suit to enforce such action. [4]
'].1he city charter requires an application to the board before
court proceedings can be instituted, but it is established in
Oalifornia that a claimant cannot delay the running of the
statute of limitations by postponing the time of demand upon
the proper officials; the statute therefore begins to run at the
time when the plaintiff first had the power to make such dein.and. (Barnes v. Glide, 117 Oal.1 [48 Pac. 804,59 Am. St. Rep.
153] ; Jones v. Board of Police Oommrs., 141 Oal. 96 [74 Pac.
696]; Curtin v. Board of Police Commrs., 74 Cal. App. 77
[239 Pac. 355] ; Wittman v. Board of Palice Commrs., 19 Cal.
App. 229 [125 Pac. 265J ; Harrigan v.Home Life Insurance
Co., 128 Oal. 531 [58 Pac. 180, 61 Pac. 99J ; San Luis Obispo
Oounty v. Gage, 139 O~J. 398 [73 Pac. 174].) Since, however, action by the ·board must precede court proceedings to
obtain a pension, a claimant who has applied to the board
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cannot sue for the pension while the claim is under consideration by the board; [5] It is well recognized that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended during any
period in which the plaintiff is legally prevented from taking
action to protect his rights. (Code Civ. Proc., 356; Wolf v.
Gall, 174 Cal. 140, 145 [162 Pac. 115J ; Hutchinson v. Ains'Worth, 73 Cal. 452 [15 Pac. 82, 2 Am. St. Rep. 823] ; Hoff v.
Punkenstein, 54 Oal. 233; Union Collection Co. v. Soule, 141
Cal. 99 [74 Pac. 549] ; Elliott &7 Horne v. Chambers Land Co.,
61 Cal. App.310, 312 [215 Pac. 99] ; see Christin v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. (2d) 526 [71 Pac. (2d) 205, 112 A. L. R. 1153] ;
16 Cal. JUl'. 562, 564.) [6] The running of the statute of
limitations, therefore, is tolled during the period of the board's
deliberations, that is, from the time the claim is filed until the
board's decision is rendered. [3b] In the present case
plaintiff, upon the death of her husband, had the power to
apply immediately to the board for a pension and to bring an
action in mandamus upon its failure to comply. Her cause
of action therefore accrued at the time of the death of her
husband. The present action, commenced more than three
years after that time, exclusive of the period of the board's
deliberations, is barred by section 338 of the Oode of Civil
Procedure. Talbot v. Oity of Pasadena, 28 Cal. App. (2d)
271 [82 Pac. (2d) 483], so far as it is inconsistent with this
conclusion, is disapproved.
[7] This decision is not contrary to that· of Dryden v.
Board of Pension Commissioners, supra, in which the court
interpreted section 376 of the charter of the city of Los Angeles which requires that any claim against the city other than
for damages be presented within six months after the last
item of the account or claim has accrued. (Stats. 1927, p.
2014.) With regard to pensions, the court interpreted the
provision as meaning that a claim could be made to the board
within six months after the time when any given payment
would have accrued had the right to a pension been established. Thus, a claimant can assert his right to a pension
before the board at any time after the event giving rise to
the claim has occurred so long as the claim is 'made within
six months after any payment would have accrued. If the
pension is granted he is entitled to receive payments in the
future but can recover only those past payments which would
have accrued within a period six months prior to the time of the
making of the claim. Thi·Sresult is compelled by the peculiar
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wording of the charter provision, which establishes as the point
of reference for the running of the six months' period, not
the time when the right to the pension first accrues, but the
time at which the last item of the claim accrues. In the case
of pensions, items accrue indefinitely.
The charter provision, however, does not affect the time
limitation upon the right of the plaintiff to bring an action
of mandam1ls in the superior court. That limitation, which
begins to run when the right first accrues, is governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure. ' A claimant may assert the right to
a pension before the board at any time within six months after
the time when any payment would accrue under the pension;
but if the board denies the claim, the claimant has no remedy
by mandamus in the courts if more than three years have
elapsed from the time when the right first arose exclusive of
the time the matter was under consideration by the board.
The charter provision does not, of course, require a claimant
to make a succession of claims every six months in order to
keep alive his right pending court action, but requires the
filing of only one claim with the board. If he does so and
his claim is refused he may thereafter maintain an action in
the superior court at any time within three years from the
time when the right first accrued.
Since the plaintiff's action here was commenced more than
three years after the time when her cause of action accrued,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Pullen,
JO., pro tem., concurred.
'
CARTER, J., dissenting :-1 dissent.
According to the allegations of appellant's petition for a
writ of mandate, appellant is the widow of Arnold Dillon, a
former member of the Los Angeles Police Department. Dillon
died on April 15, 1934. In September, 1935, appellant filed
an application for a pension with the respondent Board of
Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. That
application was denied by respondent on February 26, 1935.
On December 5, 1938, appellant filed in the superior court a
petition for a writ of mandate to compel the respondent tQ
make an order awarding her a pension and that said pension
be paid. The superior court entered a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was sustained and a request to amend

refused. From that judgment appellant appeals. The demurrer was sustained on the ground that the proceeding was
barred by the statute of limitations.
The basis of appellant's claim to a pension is found in article 17, section 183 of the charter of Los Angeles. That section provides:
"Whenever a member of the police or fire department shall
die as a result of any injury received during the performance
of his duty, or other sickness caused by the discharge of such
duty, or after retirement . . . then an annual pension shall
be paid in equal monthly installments to his widow . . . in an
amount equal to one-half (Yz) of the average monthly rate of
salary which said deceased member shall have received in
such department during the three years immediately preceding the time of his death or the date of his retirement. . . .
Said pension shall be paid to the widow during her lifetime
or until she remarries. . . . "
The Los Angeles Charter, article 28, section 376, in respect to claims against, the city, provides that no suit may
be broughton a demand unless a claim is filed within six
months after the last item of the claim accrues.
The statute of limitations here invoked is section 338 (1) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing a three year period
of limitation on actions upon a liability created by statute.
It cannot be doubted that that section is applicable to an action
for the recovery of the pension here involved.
To ascertain whether or not appellant's action is barred, it
is of course necessary to determine when her action accrued
as that is the point of commencement of the running of the
statute. That problem has been solved by this court in the
recent case of Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 6
Cal. (2d) 575 [59 Pae. (2d) 104]. There a police officer of
Los Angeles was killed in the line of duty. Ten months after
his death the widow filed an application for a pension with the
Board of Pension Commissioners. The application was denied
and the widow sought in the superior court to compel the
payment of the pension by mandamus. The superior court
held that her action for the writ of mandate was barred because of her failure to file a claim within six months after her
husband's death as required by section 346 of the Los Angeles City Charter. This court reversed the lower court holding
that an obligation to pay a pension is a continuing one, each
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monthly installment being a separate cause of action accruing
at the time it became due, and that therefore the claim may
be filed at any time after death but petitioner could recover
no more than the installments accruing within the six months'
period preceding the filing thereof. This court said in that
case at page 580:
"The right to pension payments is a contin'Uing right.
Petitioner by her conduct may have barred herself from collecting payments which have accrued, but this does not mean
that she is without means to enforce the right to present and
future pension payments, as distinguished from past and
accrued pension payments, provided she proceeds to do so in
the manner required by law. The distinction between a
single covenant and a continuing covenant is well settled in
the law. (McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384, 395; GermanAmerican Savings Bank v. GoUmer, 155 Cal. 683 [102 Pac.
932, 24 L. R. A. (N. S) 1066]; M'Ulborn v. Montezuma Improvement 00., 69 Cal. App. 621 [232 Pac. 162] ; Woodard v.
Glenwood Lumber 00., 171 Cal. 513 [153 Pac. 951] ; Grotheer
v. Panama-Pacific Land 00., 41 Cal. App. 19, 22 [181 Pac.
667] ; Oongregation of Roman Oatholic Ohurch of Ascension
v. Texas & P. Ry. 00.,41 Fed. 5-64.) A case directly in point
is Gaffney v. Young et al., 200 Iowa, 1030 [205 N. W. 865].
In the Gaffney case, the deceased husband of the petitioner in
said action, died on January 18, 1912, of illness as result of
exposure suffered in the performance of his duties as a policeman. Petitioner filed application for pension on September
19, 1924, more than twelve years after the death of her husband. The claim was rejected. There were no charter provisions requiring the presentation of a claim within six months
or within any other period of time, but in the Gaffney case,
as in the Hermanson case, 219 Cal. 622 [28 Pac. (2d) 21], the
plea of the statute of limitations was raised. The court
passed directly upon the question and said:
" 'The question here is whether, when the right of the appellee to a pension accrued and vested iuher on the death of
her husband, the right to enforce it may be wholly lost or
barred by a failure to do so within the period of any statutory
limitation. The act providing for the creation of the pension
fund and for the payment of pensions from it fixes no limit of
time within which application for a pension must be made or
action to enforce the right commenced. The appellee's right to
the pension, assuming it to exist, and to the payments to be

DILLON v; BOARD OF PENSION COMMRS.

435

[18 C. (2d) 427]

made monthly would continue during her life, so long as she
remained unmarried and of good moral character. The right
was and is a continuing one, and, so far as present and future
payments are concerned, we are of the opinion it. was one she
could enforce at-any time upon proof· of the facts sustaining
it. . . .
" 'If appellee was, on the death of her husband, entitled to
a pension,her. right to present and future payments from the
pension fund is not barred by al+Y provision of the statute of
limi ta tions. . . .
" 'Counsel for appellants relies. upon Nicolsv. Board of
Oom'rs., 1 Cal. App. 494 [82 Pac. 557]· . . . and Lund v.
]{inneapolis etc. Relief Ass'n., 137 Minn.' 395 [163 N. W.
742] . . . as holding that a claim for a pension may be barred
by the statute of limitations. . . . In neither of these cases
was the fact that the right to the pension. was a continuing
one considered.' ( Italics ours.)
" 'It may be added that in the case of Nicols v. Board of
Oommissioners, supra, the claim made was in its entirety for
past accrued payments. The same questIOn was therefore not
before the court on the facts of that case, and for that very
good reason is not even considered.
" 'It is our opinion that the petitioner is entitled to all
those periodic pension payments which fell due within a
period of six months prior to her application to the Board of
Pension Commissioners, and to all those periodic pension payments which have accrued since that date and which will continue to accrue in the future under the provisions of section
183 of the charter.' "
It necessarily follows that if the obligation is a continuing
one, and the obligation to pay each installment accrues
when the same becomes payable, and the issue for determination is whether or not a claim has been filed in time, the same
·rule applies as·' when the statute of limitations is involved.
rrhere cannot logically or reasonably be two accrual dates for
the obligation to pay a pension, that is, one to be applied with
respect to the time when a claim must be filed and the other
with· respect to the time of commencement of the statutory
period of limitation. The Dryden case is wholly decisive of
the issue here presented.
The attempt of the majority opinion to escape the sound
conclusion of the Dryden case is neither persuasive nor based
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The majority opinion concedes that under the DrYden case" any time limitation upon
the right to sue for each installment necessarily commences
to run from the time when that installment actually falls
due, " but then proceeds to the conclusion that when mandamus is involved,. as in the case at bar, the matter to be determined is the right to the status of a pensioner as distinguished from the right to each installment as it becomes pay~
able. It omits to state that the proceeding in the Dryden
case was also a proceeding to obtain a writ of mandate and
the status of petitioner as a pensioner was fully as much involved in that case as in the case at bar; it was not an action
to recover installments of the pension. But in any event
there is no true basis for a distinction between the two types
of proceeding. In an ordinary common law action to recover
pension installments the gist of the action would be the primary consideration of whether the plaintiff was entitled to a
pension, that is, his status as a pensioner.
The Dryden case is not properly distinguishable on the
ground that the court there determined that the meaning of
section 346 of the charter was "that a claim could be made
to the Board within six months after the time when any given
payment would have accrued had the right to a pension been
established." The proceeding in the Dryden case was, as
above seen, for the express purpose of establishing the right
to the pension, and was not one to recover an installment of
the pension after the right thereto had been ascertained. Nor
may that case be distinguished on the ground that there is any
difference between when the time commences to run within
which a claim must be presented and when the statute of
limitations commences to run. The Dryden case relies upon
and quotes extensively from the case of Gaffney v. Young, 200
Iowa 1030 .[205 N. W. 865]. The Gaffney case involved a
statute of limitations in respect to pensions rather than a claim
requirement, and held that the statute commences to run from
each installment as it became payable.
The majority opinion then arrives at the unsupportable
conclusion that a pension claimant may file his claim and have
it considered at any time for future installments and those
accruing within six months prior to the time the claim is
filed, but if the board rejects the claim he is without remedy if
more than three years, exclusive of the time the board is considering the claim, have expired since the death from which
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the right to a pension is derived. Such strange results are not
compelled by the claim provision. Logically and reasonably
the point of commencement of the running of the time should
be the same whether the claim provision or the statute of
limitations is involved.
It may be that the result of such a conclusion is that a claim
must be filed for each installment of pension, but there is
tlOthing unusual or unreasonable in such a condition. Conditions may arise from time to time such as the marriage of the
p'ension claimant, which would defeat her' right to the continuation of the pension. The filing of the claim for each
i.nstallment would insure the discontinuance of payments for
pensions no longer payable. It is required that municipal
civil service employees must file claims for their 'salaries.
(Shannon v. City of Los Angeles, 205 Cal. 366 [270 Pac.
682] .)
It is recognized that the statute does not run on a continu,.
ing obligation under a contract except as to those obligations
falling due prior to the statutory time before the commence,:"
ment of the action. (De Uprey v. De Uprey, 23 Cal. 352;
Hinkel v. Crowson, 83 Cal. App. 87 [256 Pac. 479] ; Bissell v.
Forbes, 1 CaL App. 606 [82 Pac. 698] ; Trigg v. Arnott, 22
Cal. App. (2d) 155 [71 Pac. (2d) 330] ; Lee v. DeForest, 22
Cal. App. (2d) 351 [71 Pac. (2d) 285] ; Reuter v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. (2d) 333 [43 Pac. (2d ) 576].)
There is no valid reason why the same rule should not apply
to pensions. A pension claimant should be able to file a
claim at any time for installments falling due within six
months prior to the date of filing, and to have a remedy either
by mand,amtls or ordinary civil action within three years after
the rejection of the claim by the board.
It is conceded in the majority opinion that a cause of
action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and
the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. (Osborn
v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501 [117 Pac. 519, Ann. Cas. 1913A,
413].) It is also held that no proceeding for mandamus will
lie until after a claim has been filed and rejected. rrherelore, since no suit can be maintained until after the filing
and rejection of a claim, no cause of action accrues which puts
into operation the statute of limitations. It is conceded that
the case of Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, supra,
correctly holds that a claim may be filed at any time for in.
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stallments falling due within the last preceding six months.
The inescapable conclusion that must necessarily follow is
that the statute does not run until three years after a claim
il': rejected, which claim may be filed at any time, yet the majority opinion arrives at the opposite conclusion. Such· in~
consiste~cy is obvious on the face of the opinion. The only
attempt to reconcile that illogical conclusion is the assertion
that the charter provision as to claims cannot affect the state
statute of limitations. It cannot be doubted however that the
charter may affect some of the elements necessary to be determined preliminarily in applying the statute of limitations,
namely, the condition precedent to the bringing of any suit,
that is, the filing of a claim. .A. municipality may require
the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to action on any claim
against it. (Dryden v. Board of Pension Com'rs., supra;
Yolo County v. Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193; Farmers & Merchants Bank of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 655 [91
Pac. 795]; Geimann v. Board of Police Commissioners, 158
Cal. 748 [112 Pac. 553] ; Chapman v. City of Fullerton, 90
Cal. App. 463 [265 Pac. 1035] ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Santa
Cruz, 26 Cal. .A.pp. 26 [145 Pac. 736] ; Brown v. Board of Police Commissioners, 2 Cal. .A.pp. (2d) 245 [37 Pac. (2d) 737] ;
Shannon v. Los Angeles, 205 Cal. 366 [270 Pac. 682].) It
necessarily follows that to the extent at least as to when the
cause of action· to recover pension installments accrues, the
charter claim provision does control the state statute of limitations, and the latter becomes operative only upon the rejection of the pensioner's claim;
.
In my opinion the law should be as held in the Dryden case,
supra, that the right to a pension is a continuing one; that the
statute of limitations does not commence to run until a claim
is filed and rejected, and then only as to installments covered
by the claim. Petitioner should therefore be permitted to
file another claim and' maintain an action thereon if the same
is rejected.
Appellant'8 petition for a rehearing was denied September
18, 1941.
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JOHN R. WALSH, Appellant, v. MIRIAM C. WALSH,
Respondent.
[1] Judgments - Summary Judgments -Determination of Existence of Issue of Fact.-In passing upon a motion for summary
judgment, the primary duty of the trial court is to determine
whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. If it finds one,
it is then powerless to proceed further, but must allow such
issue to be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. Issue
finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which
the· ·summary judgment law turns.
[2a,2b] Id.-Summary Judgments-Issue of Fact-Ambiguity in
Contract.-In an action by a son as third-party-beneficiary
under a property settlement agreement which, after giving the
wife custody of the children of the parties, contains an agreement on her part to maintain "said child or children" so long
as she received the payments provided for, a motion for summary judgment should be denied where it appears that there
is an issue as to whether the quoted words are words of description merely or words of limitation, which issue is to be
determined after the receiving of evidence, in other words, an
issue of fact.
[3] Contraets-Interpretation-Function of Trial Court.-When a
contract is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or uncertain, it is primarily the duty of the, trial court to construe
it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties in the case
to produce evidence of the facts, circumstances. and conditions
surrounding its execution and the conduct of the parties relative thereto.
[4] Evidence,.-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid· of Interpretation-Intention of Parties.-Where· the language of a contract is fairly susceptible of either one of two constructions
without doing violence to its usual and ordinary import; extrinsic evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the intention of the parties. For this purpose conversations between and declarations of the parties during the
negotiations at and before the execution of the contract may
be shown.
4. See 6 Cal. Jur. 249; 10 Cal. Jur. 930; 20 Am. Jur. 994..
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2, 6. Judgments, § 8a; 3. Contracts,
§ 161; 4. Evidence, § 399; 5. Contracts, § 163.

